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To: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>
Cc: Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com>, Simon Josefsson <simon+keydist@josefsson.org>, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, keydist@cafax.se
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 14 Jan 2002 18:58:16 -0500
In-Reply-To: <200201142355.g0ENtji00892@astro.cs.utk.edu>
Sender: owner-keydist@cafax.se
User-Agent: Gnus/5.0808 (Gnus v5.8.8) Emacs/20.7
Subject: Re: looking for draft volunteers

Yea, but even if there is a framework with multiple levels of trust, a
company that implements only "causual" trust can still claim to be
"secure".  Heck, companies claim to be secure when they use rot13.  I
don't think you can stop that from happening.

-derek

Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu> writes:

> >  My point is that I think it's ok if we only solve
> > the casual use problem.
> 
> I think if we only solve the casual use problem, without defining
> more trustworthy mechanisms, then marketers will tell customers 
> that the products that use these mechanisms are "secure", or
> "trustworthy" when they're really only epsilon more trustworthy 
> than what we have now.
> 
> OTOH, if we design a framework that allows multiple degrees of
> trust, and multiple paths for establishing trust, the same products
> that provide a casual level of security for things authenticated
> solely by DNS, can also provide a higher level of security for
> things authenticated by more trustworthy means.  
> 
> Keith

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available

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