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To: Brad Knowles <brad.knowles@skynet.be>
cc: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>, DNSOP WG <dnsop@cafax.se>
From: Edward Warnicke <eaw@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 08:51:22 -0400 (EDT)
In-Reply-To: <a0600122fbb30230e0752@[192.168.0.3]>
Sender: owner-dnsop@cafax.se
Subject: Re: draft-warnicke-network-dns-resolution-02.txt

I seem to have miscommunicated.  I am in no way suggesting that a router
provide arbitrary "lawful intercept" services for some unknown
party in some other country.  Please see
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-baker-slem-architecture-01.txt

You may also find the previous thread on this draft informative:
http://www.cafax.se/dnsop/maillist/2003-02/msg00058.html

Ed

On Tue, 8 Jul 2003, Brad Knowles wrote:

> At 11:46 PM -0400 2003/07/07, Edward Warnicke wrote:
>
> >  The application I'd originally written the draft to deal with was
> >  identification of the first-hop router as the intercept access point
> >  for Lawful Intercept ( wiretapping ).  The intention is *not* for
> >  a host to use this method to discover anything, but rather for
> >  *other* servers in the network to use this method to be able to
> >  discover the IP address of the first-hop router(s) so that they may
> >  request some service from the first-hop router(s) related to the host.
> >  Some method of identifying the intercept access point is necessary
> >  for Lawful Intercept.
>
> 	For a purely US-only application, or for an application where the
> source country, target country, and all intervening countries have
> similar laws, I think that might potentially be a valid use.
>
> 	However, in the modern Internet, I don't think that really has
> much application.  I don't think anyone is about to do anything that
> would allow anyone else to request that their router provide
> arbitrary "lawful intercept" services for some unknown party in some
> other country.
>
> 	Who knows when this kind of information might be used for
> corporate or gov't espionage, or frequently and casually abused by
> people with the necessary access, who probably don't even have to be
> real law enforcement officers, regardless of how corrupt the police
> department may be?
>
>
> 	And if you can't get broad adoption of this sort of feature, then
> what possible use could it serve?
>
>
> 	I'm sorry.  Given what we've learned so far about this, I would
> argue most vehemently that we should do everything within our power
> to actively kill this proposal, and not just decide whether or not to
> passively fail to support it.
>
> --
> Brad Knowles, <brad.knowles@skynet.be>
>
> "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
> safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
>      -Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania.
>
> GCS/IT d+(-) s:+(++)>: a C++(+++)$ UMBSHI++++$ P+>++ L+ !E-(---) W+++(--) N+
> !w--- O- M++ V PS++(+++) PE- Y+(++) PGP>+++ t+(+++) 5++(+++) X++(+++) R+(+++)
> tv+(+++) b+(++++) DI+(++++) D+(++) G+(++++) e++>++++ h--- r---(+++)* z(+++)
>
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