Re: Interim signing of the root zone.

[Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>]

Brad Knowles;

> >  People pay with credit card, not because of PKI, but because
> >  credit card campanies give credentials to their customers.
> 
> 	The credit card companies lose billions of dollars a year due to 
> fraud.  They want more secure transactions than most anyone else in 
> the world, and they are paying *BIG* bucks to make it happen.

Correct, so far.

> And a KI or PKI is a critical part of that task.

Credit card users and credit card companies, the first and the second
parties, already share 4 digit numbers to secure some transaction.

That is the KI.

Trusted third parties does not imporove the situation at all.

> 	Are you willing to have your startup risk billions of dollars a 
> year because you didn't secure the transactions, but you guarantee 
> them anyway?

Credit card companies take the risk.

Trusted third parties do not.

Root server operators do not.

> >  Shared key cryptography with long and random enough keys is simply
> >  secure regardless of the number of the users.
> 
> 	Shared keys that long and random can't be remembered by users, 
> and there has to be some sort of KI to support them.

Secure enough shared key is much shorter than public keys with
untrustworthy strength.

> >  Your argument should be that, public key cryptography is insecure
> >  because it relies on the security of transactions of shared key
> >  cryptography which is '"secure" as an inverse power of the numer of'
> >  transactions which have the shared keys exchanged through PKI for
> >  so may transactions,
> 
> 	Shared key transactions are a critical part of public key 
> transactions.  The public key part is just enough to allow you to 
> securely exchange shared session keys which then automatically go 
> away.
> 
> 	The problem is with persistent shared key cryptography.

Shared keys are just enough to allow you to securely exchange shared
session keys which then automatically go away.

There is no problem from the beginning.

> >  Over the real world Internet, people are already paying on line with
> >  credit cards, because credit card companies are giving credential to
> >  their users through the direct relationships between the credit card
> >  companies and the users.
> 
> 	How many users are willing to buy things over the net that aren't 
> secured with SSL?

All.

It is merely that credit companies, not users, wrongly believe that
the Internet is less secure than phone network.

The reality is that local ISPs and local exchange carriers are equally
(un)trustworthy.

> Well, any use of SSL is using public key 
> cryptography, and needs a PKI.

And, it does not secure the identity of credit card users.

> 	If you're willing to use credit cards without securing the 
> transaction, then feel free to share your credit card numbers on this 
> mailing list.

Instead, give me packet dump of your credit card transaction
secured by a shared key exchanged with public keys.

Then, after the transaction finishes, tell me the shared key.

> >  You can't use your credit card for your shopping, if the shop you are
> >  paying for can not communicate with a credit card company to
> >  authorize your credential information, for which PKI is useless.
> 
> 	How the hell do you think they authorize the card?!?

Over phone, fax or the Internet.

> >  On the other hand, credit card companies or any other entities are
> >  giving credential to their users through direct relationships between
> >  the entities and the users. They can exchange and are already
> >  exchanging shared keys through the direct relatiohships.
> 
> 	And how do you think those direct relationships are handled in 
> the first place?!?

By creating a bank account, for example.

> >  Nothing is different on (in)secure DNS that there is no point on
> >  signing the root zone.
> >
> >  The real world does not need PKI nor secure DNS.
> 
> 	Feel free to give us your social security number, your credit 
> cards, and all your other personal data.

Hugh?

I don't have any social security number.

However, I give my credit card number and other personal data to my
local ISP.

It does not mean that a public mailing list protect my privacy
information as well as ISPs.

> 	If you're not willing to do that, then please share with us how 
> you are going to secure any transaction that uses this kind of 
> information.  Moreover, please explain how you are going to do that 
> but *not* using SSL, TLS, ssh, or any other form of encryption.

Instead, please recognize how we are securing such transactions over
phone or fax.

Are you using SSL with fax?

						Masataka Ohta
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