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To: moore@cs.utk.edu (Keith Moore)
Cc: rja@extremenetworks.com, keydist@cafax.se
From: Bill Manning <bmanning@isi.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:09:38 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <200203261955.g2QJt6t22420@astro.cs.utk.edu> from Keith Moore at "Mar 26, 2 02:55:06 pm"
Sender: owner-keydist@cafax.se
Subject: Re: My take on the BoF session

 influence != dictate

 each child has a direct, causal relationship with its
 parent.  if a majority of the children make a change, there
 is strong incentive for the parent to accomodate such changes
 as they impact the parent/child relationship. 

 US DoD is one of ~300 tlds that might have a direct influence
 on the root.  To my knowledge, none have the ability to dictate
 root key policies.



% > If one considers the case of the US DoD (which
% > conveniently has their own TLD, for historical reasons),
% > and can strongly influence the root key's assurance properties,
% > the scaling properties are even better than for a single
% > subdomain.
% 
% if the US DoD can dictate the root key's policies, IMHO that's 
% a very good reason to consider it untrustworthy.  things that
% the US government considers 'national security' interests 
% (and therefore worthy of DoD attention) are usually hostile to 
% other interests using DNS - often including the interests of 
% US citizens.
% 
% OTOH if the US DoD wanted to invest trust in the .MIL key,
% that's their own business.  but an argument that dnssec gives
% the US DoD the excuse to control the root is NOT an argument 
% in favor of increased reliance on dnssec.
% 
% Keith
% 


-- 
--bill

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