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To: Ted.Hardie@nominum.com
cc: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, keydist@cafax.se
From: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>
Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2002 15:15:16 -0500
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 09 Jan 2002 11:59:52 PST." <20020109115952.A71020@shell.nominum.com>
Sender: owner-keydist@cafax.se
Subject: Re: From whence we came...

> > > DNSSEC helps you to know that the materials you got from the wallet
> > > were the materials that the owner put in there.
> >
>
> > this is only true if you trust DNSSEC, and DNSSEC seems to assume
> > a trust model that not everyone would consider valid.
> >
> > this is fine if you don't make DNSSEC an inherent part of the trust chain.
> > it's not fine if you design a system that requires that everyone that uses
> > it place trust in DNSSEC.
>
> DNSSEC should not be part of the trust chain for the passport, the
> university ID, or the driver's license.  It's the trust mechanism for
> ensuring the wallet's contents are those placed there by the wallet's
> owner, not for any of the IDs the wallet contains.

perhaps, but if your mechanism for deciding whether to trust one or more
of the credentials in the wallet also requires that you trust that the
credentials were placed there by the wallet's owner, then you've made
DNSSEC a critical part of that trust chain.

Keith



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