Re: From whence we came...

[Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>]

Steve Hanna <steve.hanna@sun.com> writes:

> Yes, a top-down trust model with a single root may work for some
> people. We certainly shouldn't prohibit it. But we shouldn't require
> it, either. And using DNSSEC to distribute raw keys forces you into
> that trust model. I think we're in agreement about this!
> 
> I was trying to focus on your earlier comment:
> 
> > Everyone: you have to decide whether you want certs or keys.
> 
> My point was that certs have some important advantages over DNSSEC
> for key distribution.

There are some applications (e.g. SSH, Linux FreeS/WAN) that use raw
public keys.  I think we should support them and provide an
infrastructure for them.  Considering that both SSH and IPsec are
closely tied to current DNS functionality (i.e. A-record lookup), I
believe that forcing the SSH/IPsec key into the same DNSSec hierarchy
as the A record is perfectly acceptible.

I also believe that the current PGP Keyservers have long over-run
their usefulness and being able to store and distribute PGP keys is
also a worthwhile goal.  The requirements are slightly different for
PGP than for SSH/IPsec, mostly because the latter are host-based
identification and the former are user-based.

My point is that suggesting that all keys be "certificates (in the
PGP/X.509 sense of the word)" is doing a disservice to the community.
You are basically telling SSH and FreeS/WAN to piss off, and I
believe that is not only unfair but downright wrong. :)

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available