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To: iesg@ietf.org
Cc: dnsop@cafax.se
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Date: 12 Mar 2000 01:22:29 -0000
Sender: owner-dnsop@cafax.se
Subject: Re: Last Call: Root Name Server Operational Requirements to BCP

Scott Bradner has asked me to propose specific changes to opreq. Here's
possible text for the security section:

   3.4 The computers that publish a server's address MUST be secured as
       carefully as the server itself.

       3.4.1 If, for example, clients use an NS record that points to
             the server f.root-servers.net, then the computers that
             control the zone root-servers.net have the power to direct
             those clients to the IP address of a fake server. Those
             computers MUST be secured as carefully as the real server.

       3.4.2 This rule applies recursively. If the address of a server
             is published by one computer, whose address in turn is
             published by another computer, then this last computer MUST
             be secured too; and so on.

       3.4.3 Administrators are encouraged to avoid this situation. One
             good way to avoid NS dependencies is to make each NS record
             point to a name in the (child) zone that contains the NS
             record. Note that this strategy will assign several names
             to one IP address when one server handles several zones.

Does anyone know why root-servers.net and gtld-servers.net weren't kept
within the .net zone in the first place?

---Dan

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