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To: Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com>
Cc: dnssec@cafax.se
From: Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 2004 22:53:01 +0200 (CEST)
In-Reply-To: <20040619201731.GA3532@chinook.corppc.vrsn.com>
Sender: owner-dnssec@cafax.se
Subject: Re: continued: rrsig(qtype)

On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, Matt Larson wrote:

> On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, Roy Arends wrote:
> > Note that it is not possible for the resolver/validator to notice the
> > difference between a dynamically signed and a pre-signed RRSIG (which is
> > good).
>
> But then a compromised dynamic signing key can be used to sign
> positive answers, too.

Yes, true. If an online key is compromised, it can be used to sign
positive answers as well. (the only solution I see in that event is "just"
take it out of the apex key-set, or at least the set signed by a
key-signing key).

> Is there any value to a special type of key that is only valid for
> dynamically signed negative answers?

It is not that the key is only 'valid' for dynamically signed answers. It
is just a key that is specifically used for signing negative responses.
The value is that a key for a negative response can be smaller (for some
definition of smaller) then a key for a positive response, so to increase
(well, for some definition of increase :) ) the speed of dynamic signing.
Negative responses are short lived in general.

Roy

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