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To: Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com>
Cc: dnssec@cafax.se
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 15:01:25 +0000
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20040511131754.GL31336@chinook.corppc.vrsn.com>
Sender: owner-dnssec@cafax.se
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i
Subject: Re: dnssec: resolver - application communication

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 09:17:54AM -0400, Matt Larson wrote:
> On Tue, 11 May 2004, Miek Gieben wrote:
> > Ad 3:
> > David has a valid point in that you can use CD=1 and query your
> > forwarder to debug. However if your forwarder is malicious this won't
> > help. I believe we also need to develop debugging tools that go after
> > the authoritative servers directly.
> 
> While I don't disagree with the need for debugging tools, it's
> important to remember that many resolvers are prevented from
> contacting authoritative servers directly by firewalls, filtering,
> etc.  In many networks' DNS architectures, the only way out is through
> an authorized set of intermediate resolvers.
> 
> If there's a malicious or misguided middlebox between your resolver
> and the rest of the Internet, you lose.  This has always been true.
> DNSSEC can't ensure that you get good data in this case, but it can at
> least prevent bad (spoofed) data.

	actually, it can't prevent bad/spoofed data, it can only
	provide an unambigious signal that the data is from a specifc
	source or not.  Anythng past that is a policy choice.
--bill
> 
> Matt

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