rollover at root, was Re: root zone signing...

[Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>]

At 9:19 +0900 10/11/02, Randy Bush wrote:
>i do not understand how new root keys will get to *all* the dnssec-aware
>resolvers.

This is a simple problem to solve.

Once the new key set is in use by the root, all resolvers throughout 
the Internet just query for the root keys and they have them.  The 
new keys are then magically placed into the configuration 
information, overwriting the old keys.

Not secure enough?

The root-signing body gets the keys printed in various periodicals 
and perhaps in other media forms.  If the key's too complex to read 
aloud, we can make words for parts of it (just like the mnemonic 
versions of PGP fingerprints or whatever that was called).  With this 
it is trivial to verify that the trusted keys are the ones to use.

All very simple, and amply secure.

The hard part is making sure that resolver managers take the steps to 
verify the changed keys (assuming the change happens automatically). 
You can not automate that step.  Making operators take this step is 
not going to be easy.  Every thing else in DNSSEC can be, but not 
this.

I'm concerned about how we get operators (or recursive servers) to 
maintain trust in the "trusted keys."
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Edward Lewis                                          +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer