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To: stephan@nlnetlabs.nl
Cc: dnssec@cafax.se
From: Havard Eidnes <he@runit.no>
Date: Fri, 04 May 2001 14:28:12 +0200
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 04 May 2001 14:07:11 +0200"<200105041207.OAA19635@catv8013.extern.kun.nl>
Sender: owner-dnssec@cafax.se
Subject: Re: SIG over KEY problem

> However, using a forwarder, which happens to be also
> authoritive for nlnetlabs.nl.nl, I get:
> - the KEY for nlnetlabs.nl.nl (this is OK)
> - the SIG from the nlnetlabs.nl.nl-KEY over the
>    nlnetlabs.nl.nl-KEY (the self-sig, which is useless for
>    the resolver).

This is the kind of trouble we get into when we wilfully and
intentionally use the same name, class and record type but with
significantly different data on the two different sides of a zone
cut.  That has always struck me as a particularly bad design
decision, as it runs contrary to all the traditional rules for
DNS consistency and for record lookup.  I have probably raised my
voice on this before, but I also probably didn't understand the
justification for why this was not a problem.  I don't suppose
someone will indulge me by repeating the explanation?

> The question I now have is whether I should change the resolver
> to explicitely choose anther forwarding server (apart from making
> it much more complicated, it prohibids its use behind a firewall),
> or whether the forwarder should be changed, or the protocol?

That just strikes me as an ugly kludge to work around what could
possibly be argued to be a design defect (see above).

Regards,

- Håvard

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