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To: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>
Cc: sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, keydist@cafax.se
From: Johan Ihren <johani@autonomica.se>
Date: 26 Mar 2002 13:30:13 +0100
In-Reply-To: <200203260156.g2Q1u6t04164@astro.cs.utk.edu>
Sender: owner-keydist@cafax.se
User-Agent: Gnus/5.0808 (Gnus v5.8.8) Emacs/20.3
Subject: Re: My take on the BoF session

Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu> writes:

Keith,

> > So, last I checked, the DNS root was *already* a critical service.
> > Someone who can get bogus data into it can already cause no end of
> > chaos.
>
> right, but placing an even greater trust it it does not seem wise.

Isn't this a business opportunity for someone who does have experience
with trust management to sell their services over DNSSEC in addition
to other mechanisms?

I.e. while I fully agree that the chain of trust from the public DNS
root down to your random zone deep-down-in-the-tree may be difficult
to assess, that could be improved by the CA selling service in the
form of delegation of

autonomica.customer.[some CA].com

to me. Then you and I both aquire the trusted key for [some CA].com
and things have suddenly improved from what we have today. Trust
analysis becomes possible since there are no unknown entities between
me and the CA and the public DNS root is out of the equation.

True, the domainname is a bit more unwieldy. But depending upon the
amount of trust that you're looking for that may or may not be
acceptable.

Is there something that I'm missing here that makes this unfeasible?

Johan Ihrén

[I'm not known to wear hats, especially not filled with security clue,
but I do have a basic understanding of DNS]



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