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To: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>
Cc: Ted.Hardie@nominum.com, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, keydist@cafax.se
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 09 Jan 2002 16:11:24 -0500
In-Reply-To: Keith Moore's message of "Wed, 09 Jan 2002 15:48:53 -0500"
Sender: owner-keydist@cafax.se
Subject: Re: From whence we came...

Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu> writes:

> It's not clear to me why you need to verify the authenticity or 
> integrity of a blob if you can't interpret the blob anyway.

Perhaps.  But keep in mind that there are some blobs that don't have
any internal integrity/origin protection at all (eg. ssh keys or
freeswan keys).  DNSSec fills that void perfectly.

> I'm aware that the discussion started in terms of using DNS.  I don't 
> know how the charter will end up, whether it will presume DNS as part 
> of the solution or not.  IMHO it would be wrong for the charter to
> presume DNS distribution and DNSSEC as mechanisms even if the charter
> were limited to associating key material with DNS-based names.

Honestly, I don't think we want to try solving the whole key
distribution problem.  I think we should definitely keep ourselves
limited in scope.  In particular, I think we should limit ourselves to
distributing keys for identities that can be represented as DNS names
(definitely host names, maybe user names).

> I agree that there is a large set of applications for which DNS should
> be part of the mechanism for locating keys.  Any application that 
> wants to associate meaning with DNS names, and probably IP addresses,
> would be a likely customer for such a mechanism.
> 
> Whether DNS is a good mechanism for actually distributing keys is a 
> different question.  Several limitations in the DNS protocol make 
> me dubious about this.

I'd like to hear your reasoning for this, but perhaps that should be
taken offline?

> Whether DNSSEC is a good mechanism to verify the authenticity of keys
> is yet another question.  As far as I can tell DNSSEC is potentially useful 
> but has narrower applicability than the general key distribution mechanism
> being considered.

Agreed.  There are some keys for which DNSSec is absolutely necessary.
There are other keys for which DNSSec would be nice but isn't
necessarily required.

> Keith

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available

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