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To: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
CC: EPP Provreg <ietf-provreg@cafax.se>
From: James Gould <jgould@verisign.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:22:06 -0500
In-Reply-To: <a06240803c7850afffec4@[10.31.200.236]>
Sender: owner-ietf-provreg@cafax.se
Thread-Index: Acqe0RfUnuhrB1jNRBCLeAa+LTW3VQABOYrc
Thread-Topic: off-list was Re: [ietf-provreg] Revision of 4310
User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/12.23.0.091001
Subject: Re: off-list was Re: [ietf-provreg] Revision of 4310

Title: Re: off-list was Re: [ietf-provreg] Revision of 4310
Yes, we kind of got into the weeds of DNSSEC specifics.  

I believe the request was to add a flag to the draft to allow the client to indicate to the server that the DNSKEY is active in the child zone.  The definition of this needs to be clearly defined, but I would assume that it is that the DNSKEY is published in the child zone DNSKEY RRset.  This is an optional attribute that the server can use for additional validation based on server policy.  If the attribute is supported by the server it should be returned in the secDNS:infData of the domain info response.  This optional attribute would be added to the secDNS:keyData and the secDNS:dsData elements.  I recommend calling this attribute childKeyActive.  I also recommend that there are no changes to the secDNS interface to optimize changing this attribute in a domain update.  

Do registries in general need this and do clients want to add this complexity to the draft?      

--


JG

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James F. Gould
Principal Software Engineer
VeriSign Naming Services
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From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 16:24:45 -0500
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
Cc: EPP Provreg <ietf-provreg@cafax.se>
Subject: off-list was Re: [ietf-provreg] Revision of 4310

I think this has veered off-topic for EPP. ;)

At 15:37 -0500 1/26/10, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>On Tue, Jan 26, 2010 at 03:23:15PM -0500, Edward Lewis wrote:
>>>  I don't think I understand this one.  Do you mean that there's no
>>>  RRSIG for that DNSKEY record?
>>
>>  To clarify - Yes.  In this instance, "in-active" would cover having a DS
>>  appear, the DNSKEY appear, but no RRSIG created by the private key.  That
>>  would make the DS "in-active" in terms of building a chain of trust.
>
>I like this idea better than just not putting the DNSKEY in the DNSKEY
>RRset.  Is anyone doing their deployment this way?
>
>On the other hand, I suppose it doesn't really matter whether one does
>it this way or by just not including the DNSKEY on the child side.  In
>either case, you have to use the old key until the TTL expires
>(because without an RRSIG, the new key won't be useful either).

If you are doing SEP=KSK and ZSK for all other keys, the best (IMO)
thing to do is to add the SEP to the DNSKEY set and include the
signature when you begin the process of changing.  After appropriate
timing, add the new DS and remove the old DS (or swap in one atomic
transaction).  After more appropriate time, revoke and later remove
the old key.

We plan to always have an emergency key on-line.  So, add new key #3
to the set of #1 and #2.  Later swap #1 with #2.  Eventually revoke
#1.  One cycle later, add new key #4, swap #2 with #3, retire #2.
And so on.  From add new key to remove there are three KSK
signatures, two otherwise.  There is always just one DS record (per
key algorithm and DS hash).

If one does not have a KSK/ZSK model, things will be different.  I
haven't thought through that though.

>So why add the key to the DNSKEY RRset at all?

So the validator can get the key.  (If it weren't there, it's not
going to be anywhere.)

Put the key at the parent...you're back to RFC 2065...;)
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

As with IPv6, the problem with the deployment of frictionless surfaces is
that they're not getting traction.
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