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To: mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp (Masataka Ohta)
Cc: bmanning@karoshi.com (bill), Alain.Durand@Sun.COM (Alain Durand), itojun@iijlab.net, dnsop@cafax.se
From: bill <bmanning@karoshi.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 11:47:26 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <3FB26842.5080909@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> from "Masataka Ohta" at Nov 13, 2003 02:05:06 AM
Sender: owner-dnsop@cafax.se
Subject: Re: well-known addresses / was DNS discovery

> 
> bill;
> 
> > 	to reiterate my concerns expressed at the mic yesterday,
> 
> Thank you very much.
> 	
> > 	Ohta-san, would you be comfortable with 200,000,000 devices
> > 	being shipped with the IP address 131.112.32.188 (the address
> > 	of one of your organizations nameservers) being burned into
> > 	eeprom?
> 
> I will be comfortable with 200,000,000 devices being shipped
> with the IP address 127.0.0.1 (an anycast address) being burned
> into eeprom, which was the point of my comment to you, yesterday.

	so would i, but for perhaps distinctly divergent reasons. :)

> I'll be fine if 127.0.0.1 is replaced by some anycast address,
> as long as certain address range (say /24 in the C swamp or
> /16 in class B) of the address is not used by anyone.

	and that can -NOT- be assured, hence the danger of
	promoting the use of well known addresses. 
> 
> > 	disclaimers about restricting, by IETF fiat, well known addresses
> > 	to special IP ranges will -NOT- work in the real world.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean.
> 
> Each well know addresses may have its own range to protect against
> route filtering and there is no requirement of mine that
> the addresses are restricted to special IP range.

	one can not ensure all parties that do routing will respect
	the IETF concerns regarding routing restrictions.  A quick
	look at the prohibitions of using RFC 1918 space in the 
	Internet adn the empirical evidence of thier leakage (AS112
	project) are a powerful incentive to protocol designers
	that operators take prohibitions as suggestions at best.
	that said, all addresses are potentially "well-known".

> > 	If you are willing to commit your enterprise to absorb 0.1%
> > 	of the total packets generated by 200,000,000 devices, then 
> > 	perhaps I will be persuaded that use of well-known addresses
> > 	is an operationally acceptable technique.
> 
> 200,000 devices are not for usual enterprises (or universities)
> but for ISPs of medium scale.

	missed an order of magnitude there.  presuming a vendor
	picks the "well-known" address that your enterprise uses
	and burns it into eproms (e.g. the recent netgear episode)
	and ships them -worldwide- then all those devices will
	try and use your service - since it has your well known
	address hard coded.   UoW NTP IP service was burned into
	a vendors hardware, saturating the incoming network links
	to the university and the university network itself.

> But, I know an ISP, internal of which I know well, with >3,000,000
> subscribers is operating DNS servers for all the subscribers.
> 
> So, what is the problem?

	excessive traffic from non-customers.

> > 	Yes, I know we do it now and it reduces the level of effort
> > 	in getting new features deployed, but in -EVERY- case, the
> > 	use of well known addresses has caused problems.
> 
> I think I have shown a solution on the problem on root server
> addresses with anycast addresses and AS numbers.

	and there are significant long-term problems with that 
	approach, such as content coherence and route hijacking.

> If there are other cases, let me know so that I can try to use
> anycast approach for the problems.
> 
> 						Masataka Ohta

--bill
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