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To: ph10@cam.ac.uk
Cc: dnsop@cafax.se
From: Simon Josefsson <simon+dnsop@josefsson.org>
Date: Sat, 06 Oct 2001 18:37:13 +0200
In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20010910074854.039d7720@mail.amaranth.net> (DanielSenie's message of "Mon, 10 Sep 2001 08:00:01 -0400")
Sender: owner-dnsop@cafax.se
User-Agent: Gnus/5.090004 (Oort Gnus v0.04) Emacs/21.0.106
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsop-dontpublish-unreachable-00.txt

Daniel Senie <dts@senie.com> writes:

> I just read this new I-D, and am not sure it's a "good thing." My
> concern centers around the draft's assumption that there are two types
> of environments, public and private, and that it is easy to tell the
> difference. I worry that with the increased use of policy routing,
> IPSec and such, we might well find cases where the degree of
> "publicness" or "privateness" of information is highly dependent on
> where a particular station is on the Internet, and what its
> authorizations are.
> 
> I could imagine, for example, a user authorized to use a mail
> exchanger which is within the protected realm of a company (yet has a
> public address which responds only if the remote requests are using
> IPSec). Should that user be able to find the address of that machine?

As a data point for this discussion, consider "mirror.aarnet.edu.au"
-- it is a large FTP mirror site, available within Australia only.
Should the IP address of the host be published in DNS or not?  Is it a
"public" or "private" host?  (Luckily, the MX's are available outside
of Australia though.)

Maybe one way forward for the draft would be to only "forbid"
officially reserved addresses such as 127/8 or 10/8.  But this seems
to severely limit (my perceived) goal of the draft, so it might not be
what you want.  I also doubt that anyone who used those addresses in
DNS would care about a BCP saying that they shouldn't.


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